TLDR
- David Schwartz refuted allegations that Ripple exercises control over the XRP Ledger, describing such claims as lacking factual basis.
- Justin Bons contended that Ripple’s Unique Node List establishes centralized power over validator consensus mechanisms.
- Schwartz explained that nodes select trusted validators autonomously and possess safeguards against double-spending attempts.
- Bons drew parallels between theoretical validator coordination on XRP Ledger and a 51 percent attack scenario on Bitcoin.
- Schwartz emphasized that the network architecture prevents any single entity from rewriting transaction history or manipulating XRP supply.
David Schwartz refuted allegations of Ripple’s control over the XRP Ledger in a public exchange on X. His comments came in response to Cyber Capital founder Justin Bons, who raised concerns about the network’s decentralization model. The discussion reignited ongoing conversations about validator governance structures and consensus mechanisms across cryptocurrency networks.
Schwartz, who previously served as Ripple’s chief technology officer, addressed assertions that Ripple wields influence over validator coordination. Bons contended that Ripple’s published Unique Node List establishes centralized authority. Schwartz dismissed this characterization, labeling it as factually unfounded.
Debate Over XRP Ledger Governance Escalates
Bons argued that dependence on a Unique Node List renders the XRP Ledger permissioned in nature. He suggested that deviation from the list would trigger a network fork. This arrangement, according to Bons, provides Ripple with practical authority over consensus results.
Schwartz challenged this characterization and drew a comparison to Bitcoin mining majority scenarios. He stated, “This is as objectively nonsensical as claiming someone with a majority of mining power can create a billion Bitcoins.” He explained that nodes independently verify validator agreements before transaction confirmation.
Bons clarified he did not suggest Ripple would inflate XRP supply. He maintained, though, that coordinated validators could censor transactions or execute double-spending attempts. He likened this vulnerability to a 51% attack scenario on Bitcoin’s proof-of-work framework.
Schwartz countered that XRP Ledger operates through a different consensus approach. He explained that nodes will reject double-spend attempts unless operators deliberately bypass protective mechanisms. He acknowledged validators could potentially stall the network from an honest node’s viewpoint.
He stressed that attackers would still face barriers to rewriting history or manipulating supply. He noted users retain the option to adopt an alternative Unique Node List should trust deteriorate. He compared this solution to Bitcoin users modifying mining algorithms.
Wider Discussion on Decentralization Criteria
Bons broadened his critique to encompass additional networks. He suggested blockchains operating outside proof-of-work or proof-of-stake frameworks depend on centralized authority. His assessment included Ripple, Stellar, Hedera, Algorand, and Canton as examples of centralized architectures.
He maintained that foundation-issued validator lists shape governance outcomes. He suggested institutional actors favor structured oversight models over fully permissionless alternatives. He proposed that genuine neutrality emerges exclusively from permissionless network designs.
Schwartz argued that XRP Ledger permits nodes to choose trusted validators without restriction. He maintained that no single party can dictate consensus outcomes or alter transaction records. He declared, “We carefully and intentionally designed XRPL so that we could not control it.”
He reinforced that the architecture excludes ownership concentration or unilateral decision-making power. Community participants contributed to the conversation and examined various decentralization benchmarks. One participant suggested that mining concentration challenges Bitcoin’s decentralization claims.





